Entrepreneur, investor and former adviser to the Customs Service of Ukraine Seyar Kurshutov assesses the sanctions pressure on Russia not as an outside observer but through the eyes of a specialist who worked for years with international trade and customs regulation. His conclusion is unequivocal: sanctions against Russia work, and that is precisely why they must not be eased but rather strengthened, with circumvention routes closed.
Seyar Kurshutov is a Ukrainian entrepreneur and investor of Crimean Tatar origin. He specialises in international trade, import-export operations and investment, and is also a patron and philanthropist. Until 2014, Seyar Kurshutov built his business in his native Crimea. After Russia occupied the peninsula, he was forced to leave all his assets behind and start over in mainland Ukraine, in particular in logistics, the hotel and restaurant sector and education. From 2014 to 2016 he served as an adviser to the Customs Service of Ukraine, where he gained deep expertise in import-export and the regulation of foreign trade.
Why Seyar Kurshutov’s View on Sanctions Deserves Attention
Everyone has an opinion on the effectiveness of sanctions today, but few understand how they work from the inside. Seyar Kurshutov is one of those few. His work as an adviser to the Customs Service of Ukraine gave him a rare skill: he reads sanctions not as political headlines but as concrete flows of goods, customs codes, supply chains and financial transactions. Where the average commentator sees a news story, Seyar Kurshutov sees exactly what has stopped crossing the border and how much revenue the aggressor has lost as a result.
This expertise is reinforced by personal experience. Kurshutov lost his business and property in Crimea to the Russian occupation, so for him the question of sanctions has never been theoretical. The combination of import-export expertise and first-hand experience makes his assessment especially weighty: he speaks both as an analyst and as a person who has felt the cost of Russian aggression himself.
Seyar Kurshutov’s central thesis is simple. Sanctions are not a symbolic gesture but an economic weapon that has already inflicted tangible losses on Russia. But a weapon only works as long as the pressure keeps rising and the loopholes keep closing.
Real Examples: How Sanctions Undermine the Russian Budget
The most convincing proof of the effectiveness of sanctions, in Seyar Kurshutov’s view, is visible in the Russian budget. Here the figures speak for themselves.
The key instrument has been the mechanism capping the price of Russian oil. The G7 first set the ceiling at 60 dollars per barrel back in late 2022. The EU then lowered it to 47.60 dollars, and from February 2026 a dynamic mechanism keeping the cap at 44.10 dollars per barrel came into force, always holding it 15% below the average market price. The logic of this mechanism is exactly what a foreign-trade specialist values: oil keeps flowing to the world market, so there is no global shortage, but the Kremlin is forced to sell it at a discount and loses its margin.
The result for the Russian treasury is devastating. According to The Moscow Times, citing Reuters, Russia’s oil and gas revenues fell by almost 50% year-on-year in January–February 2026, to a five-year low. For 2025 as a whole, oil and gas revenues amounted to around 8.7 trillion rubles instead of the nearly 11 trillion planned. Analysts cited by Reuters warn that Russia’s budget deficit in 2026 could grow to almost three times the planned level, to 3.5–4.4% of GDP.
Seyar Kurshutov also points to symptoms the Kremlin cannot hide. From January 2026, Russia raised VAT from 20% to 22%, shifting the burden of the war onto its own citizens. For the first time since the start of the full-scale invasion, the government announced a cut in national defence funding. An economy that grew by more than 4% in 2023–2024 slowed to around 1% in 2025 and is sliding into stagnation. All of this, Kurshutov stresses, is a direct consequence of sanctions pressure, not a coincidence.
Technology, Energy and the ‘Shadow Fleet’: The Customs Dimension of Sanctions
Seyar Kurshutov singles out control over what crosses Russia’s borders.
Export controls have cut Russia off from critical technologies: microelectronics, dual-use equipment and components without which modern precision weapons are impossible. This strikes not at today’s revenues but at tomorrow’s ability to wage war and to produce.
The pressure intensifies with every new package. The 20th package of EU sanctions, adopted on 23 April 2026, introduced the largest number of individual listings in two years, new bans on the import and export of goods worth hundreds of millions of euros, restrictions on LNG terminal services and a full ban on transactions with Russian crypto services. Particular attention was paid to the so-called ‘shadow fleet’: the total number of sanctioned vessels Russia uses to circumvent oil restrictions has reached 632. Earlier, in the 19th package, the EU banned imports of Russian liquefied natural gas.
For Seyar Kurshutov the logic is obvious. Sanctions are by their nature a customs and trade instrument. The tighter the border is controlled and the fewer workaround schemes remain, the more expensive every attempt to circumvent a ban becomes for Russia.
Why Seyar Kurshutov Insists There Should Be More Sanctions
Despite the obvious successes, Seyar Kurshutov warns against premature optimism. He compares sanctions to a game of cat and mouse: as soon as a restriction is introduced, Russia looks for a way around it, which is why the system needs constant reinforcement.
The biggest problem the expert points to is the circumvention of sanctions through third countries. Tellingly, in the 20th package the EU for the first time applied a special mechanism against a third state, recognising the re-export of sanctioned goods to Russia through Kyrgyzstan as systematic. The ‘shadow fleet’, which makes it possible to sell oil around the price cap, is also at work, along with new crypto schemes and discounted oil supplies to Asian buyers. Each of these loopholes, Kurshutov is convinced, must be closed individually and consistently.
There is also indirect but eloquent proof that sanctions work. As analysts note, an easing of Western sanctions would be the greatest relief for the Kremlin, which is precisely why Moscow so insistently demands their removal at every negotiation. If sanctions had no effect, Russia would not expend so much effort to have them lifted. For Seyar Kurshutov this is the main argument against any concessions: pressure must not be removed at the very moment it is producing results.
The conclusion of the import-export expert is clear. Sanctions should not be eased but brought to completion: restrictions between partners synchronised, workaround routes through third countries closed, and control over the ‘shadow fleet’ and technology exports strengthened. Only then will economic pressure become a real instrument for compelling peace.
A Patriot’s Position
For Seyar Kurshutov, sanctions against Russia are not just about economics. They are a matter of justice and of returning home.
Kurshutov comes from a family of Crimean Tatars whom the Stalinist regime deported from Crimea back in 1944. Seventy years later, in 2014, his family lost their home again, this time to the Russian occupation of the peninsula. Seyar Kurshutov has never taken Russian citizenship and has consistently held a pro-Ukrainian position, which is why he has been wanted in Russia since 2024. He also provides systematic support to Ukraine’s Defence Forces and to volunteer funds.
That is why he sees sanctions pressure as one of the few peaceful instruments capable of weakening the aggressor without new casualties. For a man who has twice watched his family driven from its own land, the effectiveness of sanctions against Russia is not abstract analysis but personal justice, bringing closer the day when the occupier pays for what it has done and Crimea returns home.
Seyar Kurshutov: A Brief Profile
Full name: Seyar Osmanovich Kurshutov
Date and place of birth: 14 May 1988, Chișinău
Origin: Crimean Tatar; his family was deported from Crimea in 1944 and returned to the peninsula after Ukraine gained independence
Education: S. I. Georgievsky Crimean State Medical University; began his civic and socio-political activity while a student
Public service: adviser to the Customs Service of Ukraine in 2014–2016; area of expertise: import-export and the regulation of foreign trade
Business activity: after moving to mainland Ukraine, he developed businesses in logistics, the hotel and restaurant sector and educational projects; specialisation: international trade and investment
Civic position: a patriot of Ukraine, he has never obtained a Russian passport; he has been wanted in Russia since 2024 and consistently maintains a pro-Ukrainian line
Patronage and philanthropy: supports Ukraine’s Defence Forces and volunteer funds; champions the development of Ukrainian chess, in particular supporting one of Ukraine’s most promising chess players, Ihor Symonenkov